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AS A LEADING PHILOSOPHER AND THINKER IN THE FIELD OF 
Continental philosophy of religion, Caputo’s latest book repre-
sents an important contribution to scholarship in this field. This 
book will receive wide reception as well as careful theological and 
philosophical reflection. The old adage notwithstanding, we learn 
much from the artwork selected for the cover of his book, Jan 
Vermeer’s “Christ in the House of Martha and Mary.” It depicts 
Jesus’ visit to Martha’s house found in the Gospel of Luke 10:38–
42. The standard interpretation emphasizes Jesus’ criticism of 
Martha for preparing him a meal—for tending to his animal needs, 
as Caputo says—instead of sitting, like Mary, at Jesus’ feet, listening 
to his teachings. Though we cannot know from the painting that 
Caputo will reverse this interpretation, we soon learn that he 
follows Meister Eckhart’s interpretation of this passage. Caputo 
writes, “Eckhart’s Martha is a clue to everything I say” (20). In 
Caputo’s repetition of Eckhart, Martha is the pivotal figure in the 
painting because she recognizes that the presence of Jesus in her 
home is a calling or solicitation that requires a response. Martha 
provides the principal concern for Caputo’s text around the ideas 
of insistence and existence. Caputo, in attempting to advance be-
yond other contemporary philosophical approaches to theme of 
the event, characterizes insistence as the action of the event under-
way in the name of ‘God.’ The event calls or insists1 in the name 
of ‘God.’ As such, insistence does not exist. He argues, in turn, 
that existence names our response to the demand of this calling, 
through which we make actual the solicitation of the event. So, 
Martha, to use Caputo’s trope, “knows that insistence requires 
existence” (45). With this, Martha’s hospitality for Jesus’ animal 
                                                
1 Caputo uses ‘call’ and ‘insist’ interchangeable to bring together Martin 
Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, and Jean-Luc Marion (who place emphasis on the 
call) and Gilles Deleuze (who places emphasis on insistence). 
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needs indicates the kind of realism and materialism that Caputo 
advocates at the chiasm of God and humans, and humans and the 
non-human animal. Caputo’s concern here is not ethics but the 
role of responsibility in religion. God insists and leaves “the exist-
ing to us, where the question of ‘existing’ is a matter of human 
responsibility” (15). Eckhart’s Martha is his hermeneutic key for 
this responsibility. 
 Vermeer’s painting also indicates an important philosophical 
starting point for Caputo. We know of Hegel’s affinity for Dutch 
painting from his lectures on aesthetics. Hegel plays a definitive 
role throughout Caputo’s text because Caputo’s concern for radi-
cal theology develops from his reading of Hegel’s Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion. On his reading, Hegel breaks from 17th 
and 18th century rational theology when he focuses philosophical 
attention on the content of revealed religion (e.g., Trinity, 
Incarnation, Crucifixion, Resurrection, and Ascension). In these 
representations, and not in any empty rationalistic formulations of 
religious belief, the concept (Begriff) is at work in religion. With 
this break, says Caputo, Hegel invents radical theology. If Caputo 
thus plays his hand as a ‘closet Hegelian’ in this text, his Hegel, we 
shall see, is anything but orthodox. 
 Beyond the cover of The Insistence of God, Caputo’s text 
has many other creative folds or aspects. If these folds do not 
extend infinitely, they are legion. I will only be able to unfold 
some of them here. The Insistence of God is a tour de force of 
novel, provocative ideas expressed in Heideggerian, Derridean, 
and Deleuzian rhetoric. It reads like a manifesto for a new wave of 
Christian theologians who re-imagine theology under the name of 
theopoetics. Poiēsis replaces the logos of theo-logy because the 
logos intimates, for Caputo, a kind of thinking that is guided by a 
separation between God and humans or God and world. Logos 
fails to hear and to respond to the insistence in the name of ‘God.’ 
A poetics is a creative, descriptive discourse about the chiasm 
between God’s insistence and our existence. In other words, we 
are integrally bound up in a mutually dependent relation with 
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God. God does not exist. We exist. God can only insist. God is 
the calling of the other for whom we are responsible. Our 
responsibility is to make actual the event that insists in the name of 
God. With this trope of the insistence of God, Caputo proposes a 
post-ontotheological religious discourse. By this I mean that God, 
for Caputo, is no longer a ‘being,’ much less the highest being 
looking down from on high. He has a deep suspicion of such two-
world theologies. Rather, the insistence, calling, or solicitation of 
God has no being, agent, or thing behind it. The insistence is 
underway or gets itself called in the middle voice. God is not a 
being who is calling us. Instead, God is a name that houses a call-
ing, an event, which cannot be confined to this name: God. Events 
can happen anywhere, but in religious discourse, God is a singular 
site of an event. With this starting point, Caputo limns the lines of 
his theopoetics through three Derridean-deconstructive “pills” that 
theology must swallow (19). Each pill elaborates the theme of 
chiasm, thereby portraying theopoetics as a kind of fractal: it is 
chiasm all the way down. In Part One of his text, he begins with 
the chiasm between God’s insistence and our existence. In Part 
Two, he emphasizes the insistence of radical theology in existing 
confessional theologies before ending, in Part Three, with the 
chiasm between the human and the non-human, God and world, 
and science and philosophy. 
 Part One delineates “the strange grammatology or poetics of 
the ‘perhaps’” (19) by discussing the meaning of “God, perhaps” 
and the chiasm between God’s insistence and our existence. The 
adverbial perhaps is said in many ways throughout his text. 
Perhaps is used to attune us to the call that is underway in the 
name of God. The name God, a “metonym for the event” (36), is 
the calling of a future whose temporal modality is always already 
to-come (à venir, 4–5). This futural to-come exceeds any 
phenomenological horizon, making this event uncontainable and 
unforeseeable. By attuning us to the to-come, the perhaps exposes 
us, not to possibility, but to something more radical, “to a possibil-
ity that for all the world seems impossible” (6), that is “the 
possibility of the impossible” (11). A theology of perhaps is, then, 
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a response to “the fear and trembling before the uncontainable, 
for the unforeseeable” (8), that is, before and for the event. This 
response to the insisting event in the name of God is fraught with 
the fragility of perhaps—we may or may not respond. Similar to 
Derridean différance, the perhaps marks the fragility of a 
theopoetics of the event. For Derrida, différance, in part, indicates 
the fragility of language insofar as language is a play of signs in 
which what we want to say (vouloir-dire) or what we mean when 
we speak is always in deferral through the different traces or signs 
by which we try to say what we mean. Structurally, language lacks 
the signified (i.e., what we mean). The signified is always, then, 
deferred. In a similar way, says Caputo, to respond to the event 
with perhaps means that we may or may not take up responsibility 
for the event insisting in the name of God. Our response may 
always be deferred. This fragility can also be seen through 
Caputo’s name for God: Perhaps (35). This locution is an attempt 
“to open thinking and practice to God, to the event that is playing 
itself out under the name of God, to what we desire in and under 
that name” (10). Yet, the adverbial perhaps in “God, Perhaps” 
(35) is a reminder that the claim of the event is not “contracted to 
that name” and is not “identified with that name” (10). For, if we 
can say that “the event is God, then the event ceases to be an 
event and becomes something that I have added to my repertoire, 
brought within the horizon of my experience, knowledge, belief, 
identification, and expectation, whereas the event is precisely what 
always already, structurally, exceeds my horizons” (10). The fragil-
ity of perhaps marks the chiasm between God’s insistence and our 
existence as a delicate, dangerous interplay whose being is always 
may-being (peut-être). 
 Caputo unpacks the mutual dependence of God and humans 
through prayer and hospitality. These are two sites of the interplay 
of God’s insistence and our existence. Prayers are always prayed 
in the midst of a precarious situation. Humans pray to God “in 
extremis” (33), that is, in times of “[d]ifficulty, disability, 
indecency, disease, and death” (46). God is precariously situated 
because God’s insistence may or may not be heard and met with a 
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response. He writes, “God needs us to happen at all. […] The 
responsibility for God’s existence falls upon us and has to be cast 
in the future active participle: it remains to be seen whether God 
will have been or whether God will be stillborn” (36). Like prayer, 
hospitality means to say, ‘Come,’ to the unforeseeable, that is, to 
the event harbored in God’s name. To say ‘come’ to the event 
means, following Derrida, to welcome the other who may, in fact, 
be a threat. God’s insistence is like “a divine stranger who needs 
food, shelter, and clothing,” which only we can provide (42–43). 
Eckhart’s Martha is the paradigm of this “hospitable agency” (49). 
She responds to the presence of Jesus by caring for his immediate, 
material needs. 
 Part Two names this theology of perhaps a radical theology 
or theopoetics. Radical theology never exists on its own because it 
always finds itself in a particular, existing, confessional community. 
Radical theology insists in these confessional communities by 
calling their confessional theologies to hear and to heed the call of 
the event, which pushes confessional dogma beyond its limit. 
Caputo aims to follow “the traces of the name (of) ‘God’ in 
confessional theological discourse” (20) by rehabilitating a 
particular, peculiar Hegelianism through his critical readings of 
Catherine Malabou’s Hedieggerian-Hegel (126–127) and Slavoj 
Žižek’s Lacanian-Hegel (136). Here, he stakes out his own 
position amidst scholarly debates among Malabou, Žižek, and 
Milbank. 
 The confessional theologies of various Christian 
communities are the factical experiences in which ‘God’ insists 
and by which ‘God’ exists through the radical theologians 
inhabiting them. Radical theology is always found embedded in an 
already existing confessional community’s croyances: their beliefs, 
practices, and reflections on these beliefs and practices. In con-
trast, radical theology has neither dogma nor particular practices 
because it is always insisting at the fringes and in the shadows of 
confessional theologies, thereby pushing them to their limits. 
Radical theology is ‘radical’ because it uproots and displaces the 
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croyances of confessional theology in favor of affirming, not its 
own croyances, but a deeper faith (foi) in events that insist in the 
croyances of confessional theologies. This affirmation of a deeper 
faith is radical theology’s poetics. 
 Caputo elaborates on this poetics through his “headless 
Hegelianism” (92). He thinks that Hegel gets two things right: (1) 
his focus on the faith-based, revelatory content of religion as what 
is most philosophically interesting because (2) something im-
portant is happening in this content. This is about all the Hegel he 
wishes to stomach because Hegel, ultimately, prevents the 
possibility of the event with the concept (Begriff) and sublation 
(Aufhebung). They disallow “the aleatory aspect of the event” 
(120). The event, not the Begriff, is underway in religion. Religion, 
then, “is a Vorstellung of which there is no concept” (92). Only by 
excising the Begriff and Aufhebung is an event possible for a 
Hegelian philosophy of religion.  
 Caputo develops this excision by reading with and against 
Malabou and Žižek. Malabou allows for the chance of an event in 
Hegel’s philosophy by arguing that each stage of Spirit’s path to 
self-knowledge is exposed to contingency and chance, that is, to 
events. However, Malabou, Caputo says, withholds the Hegelian 
Aufhebung from this event-ful tychism. She retains the Aufhebung 
as the telos of Spirit. Regardless of the contingent means of 
Spirit’s development, Spirit is, nevertheless, headed toward a 
foreseeable end. The means may be event-ful, but the end is not. 
For an event to be possible, however, the means and the end must 
be open to the coming of that which cannot be foreseen. For 
Caputo, this means, for example, that the death of God must 
possibly be the end of God tout court and not simply a transfor-
mation of God. He requires the possibility of God’s death to be a 
live option, to borrow William James’s phrase, because without 
the necessity of this possibility, we have no chance for an event. 
The means and the end must be open to the event, which is 
unforeseeable. The perhaps accompanying our response opens 
God to this possibility of really dying. If we do not respond, we 
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kill God (133–135). Caputo turns to Žižek because Žižek’s read-
ing of Hegel resurrects the “atheistic death-of-God,” thereby 
ridding of the Hegelian Aufhebung (137). However, Žižek takes 
this too far. He prevents “the event from below” (136). He 
focuses, not on a primordial victory of Spirit in the end, but on 
primordial loss from the very beginning. Spirit becomes a matter 
of pure presupposition, fiction, or fantasy, which makes events 
into a matter of sheer decisionism or merely what we construct. 
Žižek’s events become too preoccupied with various croyances 
and not in the event itself, not in the foi that lies deeper than any 
single belief (144). By displacing Hegel’s Begriff and Aufhebung 
with a faith in events, Caputo presents his poetics as hardly 
Hegelian but, nevertheless, inspired by Hegel. His poetics of the 
event is “a thinking that tries to put itself (stellen) forth (vor) in a 
discursive formation, or rather to put forth an event, to formulate 
an image, a picture, a story, a body of tropes that gives word to the 
event, to provide insistence with a discursive existence” (115). 
This Hegelian philosophy of religion “provides a poetics of the 
event that is being nominated and denominated […] in the name 
of God” (116). 
 In Part Three, Caputo returns to Eckhart’s Martha to present 
a “new religious realism and materialism” by rethinking 
Continental philosophy’s approach to science (22). After all, God 
is a name of the insisting event, “whose existence can only be 
found in matter, space, and time” (22). This extends the chiasmic-
fractal to the human and non-human, God and world, and science 
and philosophy. The middle voice in which “something is getting 
itself called in and under the name (of) ‘God’” has precluded our 
identifying this calling with any caller (171). This means that the 
reach and dimensions of this calling are indeterminate. So, 
Caputo asks, “Is it God calling from beyond the world—or is it the 
world calling under the name of God? Does God call through the 
world—or does the world call through God?” (171). Caputo leaves 
these questions intentionally unanswered in order to emphasize 
that the insistence of God is also the insistence of materiality, 
animality, and machine. Not only is God insisting, but also every 
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distinct other “lays claim upon us in a genuinely demanding way” 
(174). 
 This renewed approach to the cosmos extends his 
theopoetics to cosmo-theopoetics. His poetics is also attuned to 
the events underway in the cosmos. He delineates this cosmo-
theopoetics with a realism and materialism commensurable with 
contemporary science. This delineation represents an important 
turn in current Continental debate over the relation between 
philosophy and science. In this, Caputo offers a critical appro-
priation of the speculative realist’s critique of Continental phi-
losophy, namely, that Continental philosophers have not wanted 
to learn from science, but have only wanted to contain it critically, 
believing that science does have philosophical import of its own. 
He seeks to save Continental philosophy from this criticism by 
developing interpretations of “objectivity,” “correlationism,” and 
“nihilism.” He demands that the “really real reality” (Phaedrus 
247c7), which has concerned philosophy at least since Plato, is 
this material world, in which we find ourselves, and nothing more. 
Caputo does not hold out for a realer reality or another world out 
there. The only world is this world here. So, though Caputo draws 
on Plato’s language to refer to what is “really real” (197), he 
challenges Plato’s flight from the world of appearances by arguing 
that the material world is what is really real. The concepts of 
“objectivity” and “correlationism” allow Caputo to distinguish two 
ways of inflecting and approaching our reality. Scientists approach 
the world through their claims of objectivity. These claims are the 
best ways that we currently have for describing the material, real 
world through mind-independent entities. This means, not that 
objectivity is wrong, but that science, namely physics, has become 
metaphysics insofar as physics and mathematics are inflections of 
the real in the sense of “the world that is there whether we mind it 
or not” (213). The correlate of the objectively real is, what I am 
calling, the chiasmic real of poetics. This inflection of reality 
emphasizes the human relation to the world and to all that is in 
the world. The “reality of the real suffers not a loss from our pres-
ence but a gain. The real has […] acquired another stratum of 
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reality with a texture and complexity all its own” (211). He main-
tains that Continental philosophy does not regard the correlation 
of knowing and the known as a corruptive, unilateral relation, 
wherein the real turns out to be a fabrication of subjective ex-
perience. Rather, this correlation maintains a bilateral relation, 
according to which a change in one engenders a change in the 
other. Scientific, hermeneutic, and phenomenological inflections 
of reality are not fictions and fabrications but intensifications of 
our really real world. The real is accessed through interpretations 
of it. We need science for widening our world and poetics for 
describing our relation to this world (215). 
 Caputo employs recent accounts on the beginning of life and 
the end of the cosmos from physics to provide an account of re-
ligion as being-toward-entropic-death. Though the nihilism of 
cosmic death provides speculative realist Ray Brassier the oppor-
tunity to say that life is laughable, the entropic death of the cosmos 
provides Caputo the opportunity to say that life is more livable. 
Life is marked as “the meantime” between the Big Bang and en-
tropic death (224). This liminal state between the grace or chance 
of life and the entropic event has two consequences. First, entrop-
ic, cosmic death intensifies existence because the transience and 
finitude of things is “the condition under which we hold them 
dear” (227). Second, our situation in the meantime shows that life 
is to be lived, following Eckhart, “without why” because life is in 
no need of a ground, reason, or explanation outside of itself (238). 
The being-nothing of nihilism is the being-for-nothing of life 
because life is not for anything else other than itself (238, 240). 
Life is for life now, not for another life to come. Cosmic death 
proves to be a quasi-transcendental for a faith (foi) in life and ex-
istence as an event without why. 
 Caputo’s Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps is a 
theological appropriation of recent developments in Continental 
philosophy that illumines the richness of our existence in the here 
and now. He continually interprets the Jewish and Christian Bible, 
as well as developments in the history of theology through Hegel, 
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Heidegger, Deleuze, and Derrida. What makes Caputo suspicious 
about religious discourse is its history and penchant for a dualism 
between life now and life in heaven, between earth and the after-
life, between life and resurrection. His suspicion stems from the 
fact that this dualism has horrendously affected how we have 
treated the earth and all that live on it, including our human and 
non-human counterparts. He seems to think that all Christians 
who follow a confessional theology are inevitably tempted to fall 
back into such a damaging dualism. This temptation is certainly a 
problem of which Christianity should be chary and for which 
Caputo’s deconstructive theopoetics is important. Even Jesus 
warns of this temptation. He tells his disciples, “And this is eternal 
life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ 
whom you have sent” (John 17:3 NRSV). This is the only place in 
the Christian Bible where “eternal life” is given a kind of 
definition. Moreover, nothing about this passage and the verses 
that surround it suggest that “eternal life” need be something out-
side of, external to, or beyond the world in which we live. Jesus 
seemed to believe that we could come to know God in this life. 
Therefore, this passage may suggest another possibility for under-
standing the relation between life and afterlife, one that does not 
necessarily cut off hope for a life after death and does not posit a 
dangerous dualism between the two but, instead, blurs the lines 
between life and afterlife. If eternal life consists in knowing God, 
as Jesus suggests, then it begins precisely in the here and now. So, 
our eternal life is, perhaps, the life we know and live right now 
and, perhaps, a continuation of this life.  
 I suspect that this last emphasis on continuation would, in 
Caputo’s eyes, be an example of the old dualistic eschatology 
rearing its ugly head again insofar as any hope for life after the life 
we live on our material, real world may be an indication of a 
falling back into a dangerous dualism. Yet, succumbing to this 
temptation can be avoided. For Caputo even keys Christian hope 
to the to-come in such a way that the to-come galvanizes us now in 
the present. Both Christians and Jews “live in the time of the ‘to-
come’” (151). For the Christian, this means that “the Messiah has 
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already come, but that means we ourselves are called upon to 
carry out the messianic event, to bring it to completion, to occupy 
the messianic position, as a way to make ready a second coming, 
where […] everything turns on what is coming” (151). The time of 
the event is, indeed, to-come. But the pressure of this to-come 
infuses the present and galvanizes us to action, to responsibility. 
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